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1. Introduction
Some who read Stein’s “Yes, but. . . ” consider his remark that there is
“no difference that makes a difference” between realism and instrumentalism a
reflection of the paper’s most important lesson for those engaged in the debate.
Stanford, for instance, focuses on Stein’s suggestion that “the dispute between
realism and instrumentalism is not well joined,” in that there is a convergence of
ambitions between a sophisticated realism and a sophisticated instrumentalism
[Stanford, 2005, 404-5]. With this lesson in mind, the “no difference” comment
seems a natural slogan for the paper’s central takeaway.
I don’t think the meaning of this slogan is properly understood, however.
I will argue that the keys to understanding this remark are not found in the
relationships among the various doctrines of realism and instrumentalism per
se; rather, the keys are found to be methodological morals that actually preclude
the debate. These methodological morals concern the relationship between, on
the one hand, philosophy (of science) and science and, on the other, philosophy
of science and the history of science. I will show that Stein’s view on the
contemporary realism-instrumentalism debate (RID) is better seen as a corollary
to his views on these other matters than as an isolable verdict.1 As such,
a proper understanding of his views on the RID must appreciate this broader
context. To set this context, I will draw heavily from Stein’s dissertation. While
it is less clear that they are to form a coherent document, one will find also in
his later work considerable support for what I argue here. However, the fact
that these are evidently consistent with his dissertation provides support for the
idea that his work forms a fairly coherent whole.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In §2.1 I will argue that Stein
is wary of the distortions and dangers of undue generalizations, certainty, and
clarity in the history and philosophy of science, and that this is alluded to in the
opening paragraph of “Yes, but. . . ”. Then I will sketch the two methodological
morals as they appear in his earlier work: that scientific inquiry is a dialectic
(§2.2) and that it is an enterprise (§2.3). The conclusions that (I suggest)
1It is at the very least clear that his view of the RID did not change significantly after 1982
when he made reference to the talk that later became the paper [Stein, 1982, 569-70] [Stein,
1987, 391-2].
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follow most directly from the former concern what may be called the relation of
philosophy (of science) to science, whereas those following most directly from
the latter concern the relation of the history of science and the philosophy of
science. (Though this structure suggests that the two morals, and perhaps the
areas in which the conclusions following from them tend to fall, are more-or-less
distinct, I have imposed this structure primarily for readability.) Finally, I will
sketch a reading of “Yes, but. . . ” (§3). In §3.1, I highlight the centrality of the
two morals, especially the dialectical conception, to the argument. Then, I show
how RID does not respect these morals and is thereby either irrelevant to (§3.2)
or wrong of (§3.3) scientific inquiry. Lastly in §3.4, and beyond its irrelevance
or inaccuracy, I show how these morals suggest that RID is a distraction from a
legitimate inquiry that is of relevance to scientific inquiry. I will conclude (§4)
by providing an explanation of Stein’s remark that there is “no difference that
makes a difference”.
2. Methodological Morals
2.1. Explicit reflection on principles: generality, certainty, clarity
My first observation is, I hope, not contentious: relative to much work in
general philosophy of science, the ideas Stein tends to engage with are often not
(yet) clear. Perhaps this is just a matter of style, his arguments and conclu-
sions still possessing the usual implicational force. I don’t think this is correct,
however. My suggestion is this: this is a feature of his work because (§2.1) he
is consciously wary of the distortions and dangers of undue generalizations, cer-
tainty and clarity, (§2.2) he strongly disapproves of the rhetorical ends to which
these have tended to be put in inquiry itself, and (§2.3) likewise disapproves
of the ways these have typically been generated from the history. It is, I am
suggesting, a reflection of a conscious attention to methodology that is evident
throughout his work. In this subsection I will argue that the first part of this
suggestion is plausible and is relevant to understanding “Yes, but. . . ”.
The title and first paragraph of “Yes, but. . . ” allude especially to his wari-
ness of generalizations:
By the word “skeptical” [in the title, “. . . Some Skeptical Remarks
on Realism and Anti-Realism”] I do not mean to suggest, primarily,
disbelief; my ideal skeptic is Socrates, not Pyrrho. Among the claims
put forward in recent years in the name of “scientific realism” there
are many things I agree with; but there is also an admixture of
what seems to me unclear in conception, or unconvincingly argued.
This is not so much different from what I thought, in my student
days, about the doctrines of logical empiricism—which have since
been pretty harshly dealt with. In the latter proceeding, I believe
that some rather valuable philosophical lessons have been (at least
partly) lost or obscured; and I fear that unless a sufficient ferment
of Socratic skepticism is cultured within the realist brew, it will go
stale and its vogue too will soon pass.
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I note three things here. First is the nature of his skepticism, which is not to
suggest disbelief, he says, but to channel Socrates rather than Pyrrho. This is
a common refrain of Stein’s. It is important to note here because it tells us
the kind of argument we should expect in the following pages. Crucially, the
argument is dialectical rather than didactic: it gives his realist/instrumentalist
interlocutor space to defend their view, and in so doing Stein aims to expose
and scrutinize their goals and presuppositions. This implies that we should
take him seriously when he says he agrees with many of the individual claims
put forward in the name of “scientific realism” while having serious concerns
regarding its conception and arguments in its favor. This means, too, that we
should neither expect nor impose a clean categorization of ‘scientific realism’ or
‘instrumentalism’; we as observers are invited to suspend any concern for the
RID in favor of learning some “rather valuable philosophical lessons [that] have
been (at least partly) lost or obscured.” In a sense, we should be prepared for
the ground under the feet of the RID to shift.
Second, he points to some of his past thoughts that may serve as a rubric
for understanding the argument here. The thoughts here are, he says, similar to
those he had of logical empiricism in his student days. Though it is obviously
a primary concern of his dissertation, there is curiously little explicit reflection
on logical empiricism there. For example, the best we may conclude from the
introduction is that, insofar as logical empiricism was to set philosophy on a
“safe path” to becoming a science or put it on a “scientific” footing, its failure
was evident [Stein, 1958, 2;10]. However, what is present is a (large) collection
of particular observations regarding philosophy, science, and their histories. His
introduction to the dissertation is dedicated to telling us why his focus is so
narrow.
Insofar as his dissertation has a clearly-enunciated aim, it is to determine the
“role of philosophy itself in relation to its subject matters,” and in particular “its
relationship to the sciences” [Stein, 1958, 1-2]. To do this, one could “survey and
attempt to systematize” the extant doctrines and then provide a “philosophy
of philosophy” that makes cogent the “diversity of philosophic positions on the
subject of philosophic diversity.” However, the results of such a program are
tainted by several doubtful presuppositions. Of major concern is that “[s]uch a
program obviously presupposes the greatest possible, that is to say the amplest
and also the deepest and most accurate, erudition.” Such an approach also
presumes that philosophy has an intelligible role (that can be determined by
philosophical reflection) and that there is a pattern in the history that will
provide insight into the nature of philosophy [Stein, 1958, 3]. There are also
two more practical concerns. First, it is clear that “success is contingent upon
the adequacy of the sample” [Stein, 1958, 3, fn. 1], which (I suspect) is here
even more difficult to guarantee than in more mundane situations. Second,
the history of philosophy provides some grounds for skepticism. Regardless
of their truth, that so many philosophers “have analyzed and counterbalanced
the doctrine of other philosophers in order to educe true principles,” is quite
persuasive on this point. “That is,” he continues, [Stein, 1958, 4]
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the very prevalence in history of essays of the sort contemplated must
inevitably tend to the result that another such attempt, even if it
succeed [sic], will be likely to experience the fate of those of the past.
We have undergone the sophistication of diversity; and any claim,
on the part of a philosophy, to be either scientific or encyclopedic,
can expect to be entertained with a knowing smile.
This pushes him to find some more modest, promising route of attack. Stein
suggests an alternative route to insight “by way of a reflective examination
of particular problems” instead of by attempting to provide a systematic phi-
losophy of philosophy [Stein, 1958, 7-8]. This, of course, comes with its own
difficulties and dangers:
If one intends to examine problems of the sciences, for instance, one
had best be clear as to the stringency of the demands which those
particular Muses place upon their votaries; many a distinguished toe
has been stubbed for too lightly tripping upon their exigent terrain.
So much for difficulty; as for defect, the proceeding is open to the
very grave charge, on the philosophical side, that what passes for
a plain historical method is rather likely to let principles go by de-
fault, or more precisely to move on a ground insufficiently criticized
and understood; that is to say, (1) failure to establish first principles
first may lead judgment to be based unwittingly upon prejudices; (2)
principles inadequately understood may be incorrectly applied, pro-
ducing merely specious conclusions—conclusions whose contraries
may equally be “demonstrated”; (3) an inquiry whose principles are
insufficiently established and codified may, even though correctly
conducted at each particular stage, lead to changes in the founda-
tion and so to overall inconsistency as it progresses.
For this reason, we must explicitly reflect on what guides our inquiry. Here
the sciences suggest some optimism, for they have faced similar difficulties and
dangers yet, historically, have at least in part overcome them [Stein, 1958, 10].
We are thus encouraged to study how this is so in the sciences; this Stein
does with respect to mechanism from Galileo and Huygens to Schro¨dinger and
Bohr. And as he does consider there to be problems of principle comparable
to those of philosophy, some light is shed on the problem in philosophy. But,
to reiterate what was stated above, there are few “general” claims made in his
dissertation, and the conclusions that are present are sometimes less precise than
evocative. Luckily, I am not the only one who thinks so. The closing paragraph
of his dissertation alludes to this regarding specifically his final thoughts on
Schro¨dinger’s view of human mentality [Stein, 1958, 397]:
The immediately foregoing remarks are extremely disorganized, and
it is very hard to attach to some of them any precise meaning. In the
latter respect, the problem that they center upon is quite comparable
to the problem of the ultimate nature of force as it was discussed
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in the seventeenth century. That discussion was far from fruitless
(although the problem was never solved, but ultimately dissolved
into far more complicated ones). The point to be made about them
is that such remarks ought neither to be dressed up until they can
pass for a system of philosophy, nor argued out of existence because
of the difficulty of clarifying them: it is philosophical, if not indeed
wise, to recognize that in our age as in ages past there are some
things that we know; some things that we are more or less clear
about not knowing; and some things about which even clarity cannot
yet be achieved.
Of course, this does not mean that nothing is clear in Stein or that he believes
this is so; he is no obscurantist, nor, I think, does he take himself for one. It
does, however, show that he is comfortable with a lack of clarity when no better
is possible at the time, and that this has been successful in the history of science;
unclarity is an inevitable consequence of seeking wisdom, one that should not
be avoided.
Third, and picking back up on the analogy between his thoughts on realism
and logical empiricism, the lessons of logical empiricism concern not just the doc-
trine itself. The crux of the matter is embodied in Stein’s later recounting of the
discussion following a colloquium presentation of Quine’s. Stein was encouraged
that Quine and Carnap agreed on the conditions by which their disagreement
could be settled, but distressed about the way Quine continued to engage (mak-
ing it out to be a matter of intelligibility rather than fruitfulness). In fact, Stein
seems to side with Quine rather than Carnap on several of the major doctrinal
points separating the two. For instance, he tells us: that “we really do not have a
satisfactorily analyzed epistemological ‘basis’ for any department of knowledge,
mathematics and logic included” [Stein, 1992, 283]; that the analytic-synthetic
distinction “serves little purpose”; and that the observational-theoretical dis-
tinction, as Carnap envisioned it, does not work (likewise dooming his inductive
logic) [Stein, 1992, 291]. Moreover, it seems clear that moving in the dialectical
direction Stein suggests clearly entails a much more idiosyncratic understanding
of theory-world relations, one unlikely to be captured adequately by anything
so precise as the frameworks Carnap envisioned [Stein, 1992, 292]. This view
of Carnapian doctrine is present in Stein’s earlier work, too, e.g. [Stein, 1970,
286-7]. There, too, the concern is less about doctrine and more about method;
his assessment of the “danger” pointed to is one (he says) Carnap would also
agree with, despite Carnap’s framework seeming to give rise to it. Like in Stein
[1992], Stein is singing the praises of reserve and discrimination:
No attempt to delimit, systematically and globally, the procedures
and notions that are empirically legitimate. . . has really succeeded.To
say this. . . is to deprecate the appeal to programmatic notions as if
the program had been realized: this leads to specious criticism.. . . It
has been possible for scientists, in creating, criticizing, modifying,
and revolutionizing their theories, to apply what is valid in [princi-
ples such as “hypothesis non fingo” and the verifiability theory of
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meaning], despite the lack of an adequate precise general formula-
tion. There is no reason why philosophers of science cannot do the
same.
Thus it should be clear that a scholastic salvaging of doctrinal details is not
Stein’s aim. Rather, what Stein hopes to have persuaded us of—“that there is
more in [Carnap’s] philosophy than most current representations of it imply”
[Stein, 1992, 294]—appears primarily methodological in character. In the end
it was Carnap who was the good fallibilist, not Quine: Carnap, he says, was
open to wholesale change of his approach to understanding scientific activity
(including the doctrine he actually expounded), should it prove not fruitful or
representative; Quine, despite his professedly leaving “all open to the flow of ex-
perience,” obstinately insisted that his current formulation was definitive [Stein,
1992, 292].2 Beyond the obvious thematic similarities with his dissertation (to
be noted), this understanding fits well with the few remarks there directed at
logical empiricism (above, and one to follow).
On this basis, I hope it will be granted that the first part of my suggestion
is plausible: Stein is consciously wary of the distortions and dangers of undue
generalizations, certainty and clarity.
2.2. Genuine skepticism and the dialectic
In this subsection I will argue that the second part of the above hypothesis
is plausible: that Stein strongly disapproves of the rhetorical ends to which un-
due generalizations, certainty and clarity have historically been put in scientific
inquiry. In arguing for this, I will sketch the relationship that he believes has,
historically, properly obtained between philosophy and scientific inquiry. This
will come down to genuine skepticism, or, what is a right consequence of it, the
dialectical nature of science. The clearest examples of his disapproval concern
Descartes and the energeticist/phenomenological school of the late nineteenth
century (especially Mach). These two cases feature rather prominently through-
out his work, including his dissertation. In the latter, each is set up in contrast
to another: Descartes to Galileo, and the energeticist/phenomenological school
to the atomists.
Take Descartes and Galileo first. As Stein points out, there is a substantial
amount of similarity between the two, for “Descartes, like Galileo, knew the laws
of inertia; Descartes, like Galileo, knew that the weight of a body produces an
acceleration in free fall”; continuing the comparison, “and yet it is Galileo, and
2This fits well, too, with the following [Stein, 2004, 164]:
a critical mistake has repeatedly been made by philosophers—certainly including
natural philosophers. This mistake is the assumption that a clarification of
“ideas”, or concepts, should always—or can always—precede the advance of
knowledge.. . . More recently, the logical empiricist school—in its early, and still
best-known, positions—had the same view; Carnap’s later writings show a quite
different view of the matter, and this development on his part is what makes me
regard him as. . . a far deeper philosopher than is generally believed.
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not Descartes, who is the father of the new mechanics” [Stein, 1958, 58]. A more
direct comparison can be made regarding the case of falling bodies, where again
they were similarly poised to make an advancement [Stein, 1958, 63-4]. Each
began their investigations by (mistakenly) taking the uniformity in the mode
of acquisition of increments of velocity to be “in the sense that equal gains of
speed are made over equal distances of fall” [Stein, 1958, 64]. Koyre´, an earlier
interpreter of the relation between them, had therefore concluded (in Stein’s
words) “that the difficulties into which they fall were due to a common, focal
sin against time” [Stein, 1958, 82]. As it turns out, according to Stein, there
was a common error across Descartes and earlier Galileo; however, contrary to
Koyre´, the error Galileo makes in his reductio ad absurdum of the hypothesis
that equal gains of velocity are made over equal spaces traversed has a different
basis despite being analogous [Stein, 1958, 75-6].
What ultimately interests Stein is the distinction in method. Each began
with the same mistake, yet Galileo, and not Descartes, recognized his error
and reached the correct conclusion [Stein, 1958, 82-3]. In this way, the case
is similar to “the respective roles of Descartes and Galileo in the theory of
impact” [Stein, 1958, 83]. One might consider pinning the differential success
on Galileo’s acceptance, and Descartes rejection, of continuity and of relativity—
the “two great principles that dominated fundamental theory in physics from
the seventeenth century to Einstein” [Stein, 1958, 85]. But this isn’t quite right:
“while it is not per se wrong or defective to make what may happen to prove the
wrong theoretical commitment, it is defective, it is “unphilosophical” to make
any such commitment without adequate reservations or grounds” [Stein, 1958,
85]. It is Descartes’s “hubristic” claim of “more than moral certainty” for his
principles of philosophy that Stein is reacting to.
Descartes’ vice, Stein suggests later, was “a tendency to jump too positively
to conclusions, a kind of anxiety about attaining final clarity and certainty”
[Stein, 1958, 289]. In contrast, Galileo [Stein, 1958, 87]:
possesses the related merits of reserve and discrimination—the twin
virtues of genuine skepticism; one might say, the Platonic virtues
of sophrosune¯ and dikaiosune¯, of balance and judgment.. . . Above
all, he knew the essential difference between the two attributes of a
theory, looking good, and being true; and he possessed a fine sense
of theoretical relevance. Where Descartes pretended to think out
clearly the fundamental principles by which to achieve a rational ac-
count of the world, and then by applying those principles to achieve
that account, Galileo sought to develop adequate principles in the
course of the endeavor to deal with the facts of motion. . .
Though not always named thusly, these twin virtues of genuine skepticism are
ever-present themes in Stein’s work (compare also, e.g., [Stein, 1974, 397]).
However, Descartes’s is not the only way this anxiety for ultimate clarity and
certainty has damaged inquiry. For this reason, the damage is properly said to
have been caused by reactions to the anxiety. Where Descartes reacted with
hubris, others have reacted with despair: the anxiety “not only can lead to the
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neglect, at great cost, of what though important and fruitful is imperfect, but
also can produce as reaction that Pyrrhonism or “skeptical despair” which Kant
refers to. . . as the “euthanasis of pure reason”” [Stein, 1958, 289]. This despair
comes in both positive and negative forms. At the outset of the dissertation’s
body, Stein remarks on an especially strong, and especially negative form. In
contrast to Schro¨dinger—who believes that the “obvious inability of present-
day physics and chemistry to account for [the phenomena of life] is no reason
at all for doubting that they can be accounted for by those sciences” [Stein,
1958, 11]—“the philosopher may think that he has better reasons than the
mere imperfection of present-day physics and chemistry, for doubting that those
sciences can account for the phenomena of life” [Stein, 1958, 12-3]. “But,”
Stein says, “this is a dubious road; philosophical refutations of the possibility
of science accounting for some domain of phenomena have notoriously been the
preludes of scientific conquest” [Stein, 1958, 13]. This evaluation of skeptical
despair is common throughout Stein’s work, e.g., in the more recent [Stein, 2004,
166]:
I think—to make one last appeal to the history of philosophy—
that the fate of Locke’s view that scientific physics is impossible; of
Kant’s view that scientific chemistry is impossible; of Comte’s view
that knowledge of the chemistry of the stars is impossible; should all
conduce to skepticism about that kind of philosophical skepticism.
Skeptical despair in facing the anxiety is damaging when cast in a positive
form, too. This is exemplified in the phenomenalism/positivism at the turn of
the twentieth century. What makes this example remarkable
is that the protagonists were not chiefly philosophers, and were not
“disillusioned” about the prospects for the advance of science, but
were physicists and chemists who espoused with enthusiasm a defi-
nite positive program. A second [fact making the example remark-
able] is that whereas essentially no contributions to the sciences were
in fact made under the aegis of that program, which soon collapsed
altogether, the more general philosophical views of its exponents
have continued to exert a considerable influence upon the views of
both philosophers and scientists to the present day.
The particular case is of the atomic hypothesis. By about 1860, the doctrine of
atomic weight was fully established. However, it was still possible “to argue that
no convincing evidence at all existed for the hypothesis that matter is composed
of discrete ultimate parts” [Stein, 1958, 293]. Indeed, alternate to the atomistic
program, there was real reason for the energeticists to hope for a general theory
of the modes of energy [Stein, 1958, 295].
However, the energeticists’ argument against atoms came not via the evi-
dence but via the perversion of an “economical” manner of speaking. Essen-
tially, they applied different standards to their own and the atomic theory [Stein,
1958, 299]. What had previously been a fruitful positivistic tendency in chemi-
cal inquiry was, in the hands of those like Mach, combined “with philosophical
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influences derived from Kant’s critique, to produce a school of physical chemists
who completely rejected the theory of atoms” [Stein, 1958, 294]. This led to, for
one, a specious characterization of atoms as “unobservable” for their inability
to be observed in the same way as “everyday” objects [Stein, 1958, 299-300].
What happened was a “subtle transformation” of the metaphysical doctrine of
strict positivism, [Stein, 1958, 302]
by which certain theoretical conceptions have their credentials chal-
lenged, while it is forgotten that the doctrines in themselves apply
quite as well to other conceptions which pass unchallenged; the real-
ity of atoms, for instance, is denied, but the awareness is suppressed
that the particular sense of “reality” employed is such that the re-
ality of chairs is equally—or at least comparably—impeachable.
What therefore follows from even a positive skeptical despair is “the tendency
to put a stop at a certain stage to the prosecution of theoretical questions by
the remark that the aim of science is, after all, just to present the actual facts:
description rather than explanation, as the often-quoted dictum of Kirchoff puts
it” [Stein, 1958, 303].3
But there is a simple objection to such a perversion of the (otherwise benign)
economical manner of speaking [Stein, 1958, 303-4]:
it is an interesting and defensible view that the object of all science
is, in some sense, the fullest possible “description” or “representa-
tion” of natural phenomena; but then the fact that the theoretical
constructions so abstract and so little obvious as the scheme of New-
tonian mechanics and its successors have been of such extraordinary
power, and capable of such extension and such great precision in the
representation of phenomena, deserves more consideration than it
tends to be given in the context.
This economical manner of speaking is perfectly acceptable—that is, without
an accompanying “subtle transformation.” Stein, for instance, is comfortable
rephrasing Newton as saying “here is a conceptual scheme involving a certain
conception of ’causes’ which appears to be eminently useful—even perhaps of
ultimate significance—in the elucidation of phenomena” [Stein, 1958, 390]. The
manner of speaking simply serves to play up a theory’s being a conceptual
scheme open to revision or replacement or, equivalently, to minimize readers’
“reading in” certainty that is not implied. But this is not the same as what I
will call Mach’s economical view [Stein, 1958, 390-1]:
3Mach in particular equivocates on the word ‘sensation’ to “dispose wholesale of the prob-
lems of physics in relation to biology” [Stein, 1958, 302]. He “finally says that it is inappropri-
ate and absurd to seek an explanation of the natural, i.e., physiological process of sensation in
terms of the conceptions of mechanics” [Stein, 1958, 303]. But this temptation—“to consider
the physiological facts of sensation as simpler and more immediate than the facts of mechani-
cal motion”—might be forestalled by thinking of the physiology of non-human animals [Stein,
1958, 303].
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What trouble there is appears to have come from a neglect, by Mach,
to consider that the enormous success of Newton’s scheme in provid-
ing “economical” (and true) representations is itself a fact, not only
of history, but about the world: the world is so constituted that the
conception, for example, of “internally determined” or natural mo-
tions versus “forced” or violent motions leads to a far less economical
representation of far fewer natural processes than the conception of
“natural powers” as general laws determining the product of mass
and acceleration.
So with the economical manner of speaking theories still are about the constitu-
tion of the world, whereas with Mach’s economical view this has dropped out.
Such an economical view of scientific explanation also “led Poincare´ to dismiss
as idle the question of the true mechanical explanation of electromagnetism”
[Stein, 1958, 392].
The lesson here is to maintain a healthy balance of the dual aspects of gen-
uine skepticism—to avoid the trappings of an anxiety for clarity and certainty.
This he made clear in his concluding remarks [Stein, 1958, 389]:
There are certain lessons that the history of science seems to teach,
and an attempt has been made to adumbrate some of them. But
perhaps the most important lesson—and here our examination of
history has bordered on moralizing!—is the virtue of a certain com-
bination of enthusiasm for the development and consequential ap-
plication of systems of concepts, with a kind of caution or ultimate
skepticism of the ultimacy of ultimate principles and programs.
What is more, this applies also to conceptions of science itself [Stein, 1958, 389]:
In particular, we have seen twice—in Descartes, and in the energeti-
cist and phenomenologist school of the late nineteenth century—the
sort of mischief that can be worked by too rigid an adherence to
a creed of ultimate clarity and certainty. And the question arises
whether the logical empiricist movement in contemporary philoso-
phy, influenced as it has been by such predecessors as Mach, and
committed to a sort of clarity and precision in the language of sci-
ence, may not be in danger of working the same sort of mischief.
And here we have a more substantial commentary—and further reinforcement
of the above interpretation of Stein’s remarks—on logical empiricism. In tying
it directly to the failures of Descartes and Mach, he makes it clear that the
worry for logical empiricism’s future is methodological: if its creed is adhered
to too rigidly, the same mischief that was worked by Descartes and Mach could
be worked by logical empiricism.
Finally, how an individual maintains a healthy balance brings us to the
double-facedness, or dialectical nature, of inquiry.4 Newton and his contem-
4See also, e.g., [Stein, 1990a, 38-9].
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poraries all appreciated that experience had the final say regarding theories.
However, experience should also play a subtler, less well-appreciated role [Stein,
1958, 97-8]:
In the absence of a general guarantee, the actual execution of the
program requires, in Newton’s conception, the utmost fidelity to de-
tail in studying natural phenomena. This conception is one of New-
ton’s monumental contributions to science: that in the investigation
of natural phenomena details are important, that they may provide
the clue to important knowledge and that they must be regarded as
a touchstone of truth.
Thus, the role of experience for Newton was “not only that of the supreme ar-
biter, but also that of the only “official” guide” in inquiry [Stein, 1958, 119].
Many of his contemporaries, and (I add) many since, have failed to appreciate
that nature plays this second role;5 Huygens and Hooke, for instance, confused
inductions from phenomena for hypotheses in arguing against Newton’s hypoth-
esis about the constitution of light [Stein, 1958, 98-9] [Stein, a, 15].
In sum, science is dialectical in this thoroughgoing back-and-forth with the
world, and it is a proper balancing of the two aspects of genuine skepticism that
enables it to function healthily. This requires “the utmost fidelity to details.”6
2.3. The “unphilosophical fallacy” and the enterprise
In this subsection I will argue that Stein also disapproves of the way that
undue generalizations, certainty and clarity have been generated from the his-
tory of science. Whereas §2.1 addressed historiography more generally, this
subsection will address manifestations of a specific, but common, error among
historically-minded philosophers: the “unphilosophical fallacy.” It will thereby
focus on the second moral: the relation of history of science to philosophy of
science. I will begin by probing a passage wherein Stein has paused to reflect
on his own historical method. I will then briefly draw out of his dissertation a
cluster of claims that appear to be consequences of his historical method.
What Stein notes first is a necessity to distinguish between “questions of
historical interpretation—even where such questions involve a component that
can appropriately be called “philosophical”—from questions of the philosophy
of science per se” [Stein, 1958, 172]. A first-pass understanding might be this:
we must distinguish between the philosophy of/in our historical figures and the
philosophy of science-as-it-is, which is to say as-we-know-it-to-function. Cog-
nizance of this distinction should, for one, mean we attend especially to actions
and reflections of our forebears ways as distinct from a proper and objective
understanding of them.
5According to Stein, this seems to be the significance of Newton’s rule IV [Stein, 1958,
98-9].
6For more on what this fidelity to detail looked like in astronomy post-Newton, I suggest
Smith [2014].
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This first-pass understanding is on the right track, for it is, of course, right to
distinguish between our own views and interpretive principles and the view of an
historical figure. Stein himself makes it clear that he has aimed to understand
what the historical figures thought. He says of his theses regarding mechanism,
for instance, that “they concern the program in the sense of what was actually
done and what was actually intended, for the most part, by its principal expo-
nents” [Stein, 1958, 172]. And one can obviously fail in so distinguishing their
own view from their subject’s. Failure to do this, Stein suggests, is the reason
for Koyre´’s faulty comparison of Galileo and Descartes. While Stein considered
his interpretation of Galileo through the lens of Archimidean Platonism “inter-
esting” and “essentially correct”, “his treatment of the historical material, in
the light of his interpretive principle [Archimidean Platonism], appears to fall
short, to be in a certain sense unphilosophic” [Stein, 1958, 82]:
What Koyre´ does can be characterized in Platonic terms: he con-
trives a likely story, but fails of the truth because he has eschewed
the more arduous task of a genuine confrontation of reality. That
just this is a, perhaps the, characteristic pitfall of philosophy—one
might therefore say, “the unphilosophical fallacy” par excellence—is
one of the principal theses of the present study; and if the analysis
contained in the foregoing excursus is sound, it may serve as a minor
example to show that that fallacy, if absolutely inescapable, can at
least be relatively avoided.
The distinction, then, means here to rule out “the unphilosophical fallacy” of
confusing one’s view and interpretive principles with the view of the figure in
question.
However, this understanding may still masks two related errors. Recall the
distinction between a theory’s looking good and being true, introduced in §3.2.
There, it was emphasized that the air of certainty around ‘being true’ was
merely apparent, and this was demonstrated by introducing as equivalent the
“economic” manner of speaking. Here, the air of certainty surrounds ‘the phi-
losophy of science per se’. Making the first error, one might take their own
philosophy of science to be the ultimate one [Stein, 1958, 172-3]:
There is always a tendency to equate the doctrines of “this our
knowing age” with that myth (cf. Huygens’s references, on succes-
sive pages and clearly intended as equivalent, to “the Philosophy of
the present day” and “the true Philosophy”), but this is not a philo-
sophical tendency even though not unknown among philosophers.
The obvious way in which the certainty needs to be stripped is to recognize
that we have hardly more right to claim ours is “the true Philosophy” than did
Huygens his own. Thus he continues,
To make the distinction cogent, per se must really be attached to
philosophy-of-science rather than to science: we must distinguish
between what certain men—contemporary or not, scientists or not—
have thought about science, and what we think about it.
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The second error is less obvious. Just before his remark on Huygens, Stein
tells us that “it is well to bear in mind, in making such a distinction, that
“science per se” is a kind of myth, the science with which we are in actual fact
acquainted being unavoidably historical.” One way in which the science with
which we are acquainted is unavoidably historical is just that we write of what
has already been produced. But what follows suggests he means something
more radical:
But what we think about it [science] is directed to some (historical)
“it,” and if we think of science as not only a historical product
but an enterprise, then what scientists thought about it—what they
thought they were doing when they did it—is a significant part of
“it” itself.
What appears essential is thinking of science as not only a historical product
but an enterprise. Insofar as it is an enterprise the role of its agents must be
recognized; hence, our philosophy of science is informed by what was theirs.
What this means is that we need not only to recognize that we have no claim
to the true philosophy, but that, moreover, because we have no such claim,
post-hoc reckonings with scientific theories must attend to what those involved
thought. Thus, I suggest that avoidance of the “unphilosophical fallacy”—the
“characteristic pitfall of philosophy”—in this context would mean also recog-
nizing science’s nature as a flesh-and-blood enterprise, both figuratively and
literally.7
Committing this fallacy seems to support three distortions that will be rel-
evant in the next section. Though perhaps not so distinct, I will speak of them
as if they are for convenience. One such tendency, prevalent with respect to
mechanism as elsewhere, has been to view theories as in a sense reified—that
is, as (synchronically) stable and epistemically homogeneous collections of prin-
ciples, results and/or representations regarding a fixed domain of phenomena.
However, recognizing the significance of agents when analyzing the history un-
dermines this, at least so far as mechanism is concerned. This program existed
in layers, Stein emphasizes [Stein, 1958, 187-8]:
About the higher layers—about the general scheme involving the
conceptions of mass and force, of momentum, the conservation of
momentum, etc., and indicating the mode in which one ought to
attempt to analyze any given natural phenomenon—there was by
the last quarter of the seventeenth century a very large measure of
agreement. . . But on the deeper levels there was not only very much
7A note on Stein’s uses of ‘philosoph-’: At least in his dissertation, and I submit it as rep-
resentative, there appear to be two primary uses. One—often ‘philosophy’—tends to be used
as a shorthand for the professionalized discipline, and hints of irony are sometimes detected.
The second—often an adjectival/adverbial variant, e.g. ‘philosophical’—is commonly used in
a more genuine classical sense, so that ‘philosophical’ means something like ‘comporting with
genuine concern for the growth of knowledge and understanding.’
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less agreement, there was also very much more explicit hesitation,
and toying with alternatives, on the part of individual thinkers. The
mechanistic program was not, even as a program, a finished concep-
tion. It pointed, for the investigation of nature, in a certain direc-
tion; but it did not completely define a route. It evoked—somewhat
variously for investigators imbued with varying philosophic predilec-
tions or intellectual dispositions—a certain image of the structure of
nature; but it did not clearly exhibit what ought to be the elements
of a complete picture of the world.
As a matter of practical consequence, this means that such reification and em-
phasis of theories papers over not only variation in epistemic commitment but
also what is being committed to. Instead, Stein takes the view “of the “ideas”
of science (i.e., the most general systematizing principles) as constituting a
program rather than a doctrine” [Stein, 1958, 284]; in brief, these programs
offer—and are seen by its best prosecutors as offering—regulative rather than
constitutive guidance [Stein, 1958, 283].
Another common (and related) distortion concerns the “dynamics” of theory
evolution. A famous example, brought to us by Kuhn, is to view the major
such changes as wholesale conceptual replacement. This view of theoretical
development is, at the very least, not warranted with respect to the mechanistic
program. A view of science as a thoroughly progressive development of theories
is likewise inadequate. The dynamics is much more complex than either of these
views [Stein, 1958, 251]:
. . . if the development of modern physics from the sixteenth century
is viewed as a continuing search for the really basic character of
natural processes, then it is possible to see, behind all the revolutions
that the subject has undergone, a very direct continuity both of aim
and of method ; continuity, indeed, in all senses of an ambiguous
phrase, in “what the science has been about.”. . .
It is the fashion in these days to refrain from seeing history as a
uniform progress toward the one, the true, and the good; and this
fashion seems on the whole amply justified. But when the history of
physics is viewed in the way we are considering, an exception has to
be made of it: there is no denying, as a sheer empirical fact, that the
attempt to comprehend phenomena by the Newtonian mechanical
program and its successors has been attended with overwhelming,
progressive success.
Such subtleties are present also in that “paradigmatic” example of a Kuhnian
revolution, namely, the developments at the foundations of physics at the turn
of the twentieth century. In that episode there was a kind of continuity as well,
preserved through the reinterpretations and redefinitions of central aspects of
the mathematical tools at play [Stein, 1958, Ch. VII].
This understanding of program “dynamics” hints at a necessary expansion
of what theories can be. The question Stein asks himself with respect to the
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“dynamical” aspect of theories is not whether, e.g., mechanism is being treated
as a theory, for “in one sense every program implies a theory; or at least a
hypothesis, namely the hypothesis that the program can be successful” [Stein,
1958, 284]. Rather,
The appropriate question, then, is not whether mechanism has in
any sense been treated as a theory in this discussion, but whether it
has been treated as a theory in an illegitimate sense, that is whether
we have supposed susceptible of empirical confirmation a doctrine
that is not in fact capable of being either established or overthrown
by experience.
The answer is no, for such “doctrine” is capable of being either established
or overthrown by experience [Stein, 1958, 288]. Thus, views of the “higher
layers” of programs as mere conventions are, if taken too seriously, in danger
of misrepresenting the enterprise of science. We will see this mistake soon in
Poincare´’s philosophy of science.
Whereas the first two distortions involve a kind of reification and homoge-
nization of theories, the third seems to involve not only this but also a homog-
enization of their relations to the world, as well as a subsequent reification of,
as it were, the theory’s image of the world. Of course, so far as mechanism is
concerned, there is the problem, mentioned above, that it was not a finished
conception and therefore did not have a settled “image” of the world. But
putting this aside for the moment, Stein, I suggest, is still troubled by such a
“crisp” view of theory-world relations. This appears implicit in his discussion
of the following characteristic of the mechanistic program [Stein, 1958, 169]:
The test of experience in the narrower sense, the test of any par-
ticular explanation (theory) by confrontation with phenomena, was
taken in a very stringent way. Not only the general aspects, or
certain particular details of the phenomena, but (in principle) all
details were expected to be rendered adequately by the theory.
The point I’m concerned with comes in his clarification of the reservation implied
by ‘in principle’. This clarification comes in three “heads”, and the second is
most relevant here. It begins [Stein, 1958, 170]:
Second, the theoretical conceptions that are brought to bear in the
mechanical explanation of phenomena are not only abstract, in prac-
tice their application always involves some oversimplification; and
this means that the agreement to be expected between observation
and theory is limited by some reasonable estimate of the errors en-
tailed by that simplification. The oversimplifications stem from two
causes: lack of detailed information about the actual conditions, and
the exigencies of calculation. For example, in discussing the motions
of the planets from the viewpoint of the theory of gravitation it is
simplest to treat the planets as masses each of which is located at
a single point. To a second approximation, the shape of the planets
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may be taken into account by regarding them as spheres. . . Next, by
taking into account the oblateness of the planets, in particular of
the earth, one can deduce a further motion that is in fact observed
in the precession of the equinoxes.
What I see as latent in this observation is that such knowing oversimplifications
complicate the ways theories “represent” the world, their diversity implying,
in turn, a diversity of ways of “representing.” This is clear in realizing that
our “reasonable estimate of the errors entailed” by an oversimplification, which
inform our expectations for agreement between observation and theory, is it-
self informed by our understanding of the role that simplification plays in the
situation. For this reason, assuming theories represent the world in largely ho-
mogenous ways—or, in more explicitly enterprise-y terms, that scientists believe
that their theories are this way; believe that they come with something like a
basic, general set of rules for how to apply them8—is not appropriate.
Thus in this way, too, assuming a theory implies a crisp world-according-to-
theory “image” is unwarranted. What this means in practice is that a scientist’s
“belief” in a theory needn’t engender strict reductionist dismissal of other re-
searches by dint of their not conforming with its “ontology”. And at least so
far as mechanism is concerned, it didn’t. That is, [Stein, 1958, 172]
the “reduction” of phenomena to “mechanical causes,” as that envis-
aged in the mechanistic program, does not entail the concentration
of scientific interest upon phenomena of motion, to the neglect of
the intrinsic qualities and patterns of things. Fresnel’s mechanical
theory of light, for example, is not primarily a theory of the jostlings
and tuggings of particles of ether, but of such qualitatively optical
phenomena as the formation of images, double refraction, patterns
of color and shade produced in diffraction, and so forth.
So however it was that mechanists envisioned the world through the eyes of
the program, it was not so psychologically domineering as to suppress more
“ontologically” nebulous inquiries.
3. “Yes, but. . . ”: a dialectical undoing of the RID
In the last section I argued for three main points. First (§2.1), I argued
that Stein is consciously wary of the distortions and dangers of undue gener-
alizations, certainty and clarity. To establish this, I showed that the opening
remarks of “Yes, but...” allude to and thematically mirror those that framed
his dissertation, wherein this fact is apparent. Second (§2.2), I argued that
Stein disapproves of the rhetorical ends to which such undue generalizations,
certainty and clarity have been put in inquiry itself. Ultimately, this came to
8“In short,” Stein says, “[Newton’s program] is not a program that works automatically”
[Stein, 1958, 96-7]. See Chapter V, especially pages 96-100.
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his appreciation that science is a dialectic, hence his turning away from the
anxiety for ultimate clarity and certainty and his championing of Newton’s gen-
uine skepticism in the study of natural phenomena. Third (§2.3), I argued that
Stein disapproves of the ways such undue generalizations, certainty and clarity
have been generated from the history. This was evinced by his reckoning with
the subtle and pervasive consequences of “the unphilosophical fallacy,” or what
is the same, his affording of respect to the many layers of complexities of the
flesh-and-blood enterprise of science. I will now bring these observations to bear
on “Yes, but. . . ”.
The structure of Stein’s argument in “Yes, but. . . ” can be confusing read
linearly. For this reason, what follows is not a line-by-line or paragraph-by-
paragraph reading. Instead, in light of the §2 discussion, I will present it as a
kind of “dialectical undoing”: I will describe Stein’s reckonings with the pre-
suppositions and misconceptions that underpin the RID in the order of (my
estimation of) their importance. My aim in this is to better emphasize how
the dialectical conception of science and the unphilosophical fallacy guide the
three major motifs of the argument in “Yes, but. . . ”. Each of these will be
given their own subsection. The concluding subsection will consist of a brief
characterization of what Stein takes to follow from the three major motifs.
3.1. The dialectic of science
The first motif of the argument in “Yes, but. . . ” actually pushes us toward
Stein’s own dialectical view. This view is already doing heavy lifting by the
second page. By then, he has already ruled out trite instrumentalism and ex-
panded the scope of a sopisticated instrumentalism to include all of “the world of
experience.” This immediately rules out any (even epistemically “principled”)
instrumentalism that tries to delineate what can be (or is) known of the world
from what cannot be (or is not) [Stein, 1989, 56]. Thus, in Kantian terms, we
are already empirical realists. Like in his discussion of Mach, we are ruling out
any laying of constitutive principles and thereby rejecting the faulty-empiricist
double standard. Stein therefore assumes that the instrumentalist’s claim can be
read as: “A theory is “nothing but” an instrument for representing phenomena”
[Stein, 1989, 50].
Stein characterizes this as a “somewhat liberalized instrumentalism.” Whether
or not Stein really thought this was only somewhat liberalized, this is clearly not
true: what Stein in fact describes is a maximally liberalized instrumentalism,
being “instrumentalism” only in the sense that it is presented in the economic
manner of speaking. When Stein later elaborates on the first irony of the RID’s
treatment of this history by considering the case of Poincare´, this is clear [Stein,
1989, 56]:
The contested reality was of the ether; and Poincare´, because he
regarded the ether as a fiction rather than a reality, was unwilling to
take very seriously (although he was willing to play with) the idea
that charged particles exchange momentum with the ether. This,
however, is a very odd position for an instrumentalist to take (the
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first irony); for there is no warrant at all in the instrumentalist
view for grading the entities of a theory in degrees of reality or
fictitiousness—regarding particles as more real than the ether.
Like the energeticists and Mach, Poincare´ had “subtly transformed” the eco-
nomic manner of speaking into what I’ve called the economic view. He did this
by speciously distinguishing between charged particles and the ether, despite
their being equally real by his own standard [Stein, b, 21-2]; Poincare´ had ef-
fectively endorsed the double standard Stein sees as recurring in the empiricist
tradition (e.g., in Locke [Stein, 1990a, 33-4], Hume [Stein, 1990b, 209;219][Stein,
1993, 189-90], Mach (above)).9
The sophisticated “instrumentalism” in play throughout “Yes, but. . . ” is
therefore only a different manner of speaking. All it serves to do is emphasize
that our knowledge and understanding are still subject to expansion and revi-
sion. So when Stein remarks that the empiricist double standard is “a bit of
unregenerate realism, doing the work of the Devil among the empiricists and
instrumentalists” [Stein, 1989, 56], he is not alluding to the realist and instru-
mentalist doctrines familiar from the RID; rather, he is saying the following: the
misguided empiricist has (i) succumbed to the tendency to speak in a realist
manner in the cases that are “closer to home” and an economic one elsewhere
(perhaps because of some anxiety for ultimate clarity and certainty), but (ii)
failed to recognize that these are, at bottom, just manners of speaking, and
therefore (iii) mistaken the linguistic shift for something real. This he sums up
in closing [Stein, 1989, 64-5]:
What we are left with is that other, provisionally, “ultimate” or
unexplained fact, that we do find ourselves compelled to formulate
our beliefs in non-phenomenalistic terms; and in this process, atoms,
electrons, fields, and the like are in a case quite analogous to that
of chairs, tables, and the like in Berkeley. The justifiable claim to
“reality” possessed by [sic] those “theoretical entities” is of the same
kind as the justifiable claim—not after all denied by Berkeley—of
these ordinary objects. To hold this is to reject the faulty-empiricist
double standard; and “realism” in this sense I endorse unreservedly.
3.2. “Nothing but” and “something more”
The second motif concerns the instrumentalist’s claim that theories are
“nothing but” instruments and the realist’s that theories are “moreover” true.
However, because Stein has rejected the faulty-empiricist double standard, the
“instrumentalism” of which he speaks is rather anti-realism. This is to say that
9Luckily Einstein, unlike Poincare´, took the theory seriously as a guide to how the world
is and explored its implications [Stein, b, 23]. Lorentz, too, took the theory seriously [Stein,
1987, 389-90] by recognizing the same distinction as did Maxwell between “what is known with
some security, or held at least with some probability, and what is bare and even implausible
conjecture” [Stein, 1989, 62].
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Stein’s dialectic view suggests that the RID is, in its purest form, the transcen-
dental debate between realism and anti-realism (e.g., idealism).10 The question
being debated is thus whether the noumena are anything like the phenomena.
Berkeley, for one, was an anti-realist. His doctrine was “that what is real is just
minds and their perceptions, and that all our beliefs about the physical world
are just “instruments” for organizing and anticipating experience” [Stein, 1989,
61]. Stein asks of this doctrine: can it be refuted? Need it be refuted?
One might think that, since a phenomenalistic basis does not appear possible,
Berkeley is after all wrong: it cannot be that all of our beliefs—especially our
belief in such a world—are but instruments. But this does not get at (what Stein
believes is) Berkeley’s essential point, which is that there is an insuperable gap
between the world and our experience of it. As we may view Kant as doing, the
failure of phenomenalism could just be considered a fact about us rather than
the world as it is independently of us. How could you possibly respond to an
anti-realist like Berkeley? If even the failure of phenomenalism is irrelevant, it
seems nothing we know—in the everyday sense of the word—would satisfy the
anti-realist. Need one, then, reply to the anti-realist? No, Stein says—they are
“irrelevant to any real issue in the understanding of science” [Stein, 1989, 65];
there is no need to reply to the anti-realism of, e.g., Berkeley, Kant, or later
Putnam.
Some have risen to the anti-realist’s challenge, however. This is the case,
for instance, with Boyd’s proposal for determining “real” validity over “mere”
instrumental validity—the latter meaning that a theory affords a correct and
adequate representation of phenomena. Boyd and his anti-realist interlocutor
have both assumed this instrumental validity from the outset Boyd [1983]11.
The question Boyd then tackles is thus understood as: how do we determine
whether theories are “moreover” true of the noumenal realm? Boyd claims that
evidence that theories are “moreoever” true comes from considering “the con-
nection of theories with the ongoing process of scientific inquiry” [Stein, 1989,
51]. However, because Boyd’s claim is at best an hypothesis—it in principle
could not have been “induced by the [noumena],” for we have no access to that
realm—it cannot explain; his purported explanation is “disconnected from its
explanandum” (see: color location problem, Huygens [Stein, 1989, 53-5]). This
is in contrast to Huygens’s hypothesis regarding the constitution of light: that
hypothesis led rather directly to further investigations of optical phenomena,
and in this sense was a good hypothesis according to Stein. For Boyd’s claim
to likewise be a good hypothesis, it would need to lead to unmediated inves-
tigations of the noumenal realm as it really is. However, this is not possible
by definition, so it can lead to no further inquiry. This is Stein’s point (a):
“argument to a better, or the best, explanation is a doubtful business, which
10It is seemingly for this reason that when Stein later refers to this paper, he calls it “an
article devoted entirely to the issue of realism and anti-realism” [Stein, b, 22].
11Boyd’s publication concurrent with “Yes, but. . . ”, Boyd [1989], also fits the description
here.
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I should prefer to view as abductive, or heuristic, or tentative at best; and in
the present case, I do not see what investigations are to follow the abduction”
[Stein, 1989, 52]. Understood in this way, as a debate about transcendental
semantics, Boyd’s claim—like the anti-realist’s—is irrelevant to understanding
science.
But the situation is even worse than this, for the terms of the debate seem to
rule out the identification of any non-transcendental “something more”. This
Stein summarizes in his point (b), that he does not believe that the explanation
does in fact explain [Stein, 1989, 52-3]. For suppose that Boyd’s hypothesis does
actually explain something about scientific theorizing and is thus evidence for
the realist thesis. What is this thesis? It is that theories that are correct and ad-
equate representations of phenomena “moreover” possess some extra attribute;
i.e., we’re putting aside those attributes had by correct and adequate theories,
each of which presumably concern the theories, the phenomena, or relations
thereof. By (a) we know that whatever this extra attribute is, it cannot concern
relations to the noumena. But then this extra attribute must somehow concern
either the phenomena, the theory, or relations thereof. However, whatever it is,
this attribute would fail to be “something more”—it would be precisely one of
those attributes put aside in the search for something more. Therefore, because
the realist thesis fails to identify any (non-transcendental) extra attribute which
is to be explained, we surely cannot identify evidence that does explain it. So ei-
ther, as in the last paragraph, the realist thesis takes the noumenal sense, which
means that it cannot be explained and is irrelevant to science; or we assume
that Boyd’s hypothesis explains, in which case it can’t be explaining the realist’s
“moreover” thesis. Should the realist forego this “something more,” they are
left with no way to distinguish themselves from the dialectical and enterprising
inquirer, whose explanation of theorizing they insist is inadequate.
It is in this temptation to respond to the anti-realist that the taste for
genuine explanations is lost, and the arguments slide into, e.g., claiming that
things would be miraculous otherwise. But an enthusiasm to find out need not,
and in especially the best scientists does not, give way to such an anxiety in the
face of “inexplicable” facts [Stein, 1989, 64]:
Indeed, if one examines the explanation offered by science today for
the existence and properties of aluminum. . . , it is hard not to feel
that this explanation, at least as much as Berkeley’s, grounds ordi-
nary things upon a miracle; but the simple fact is that whatever our
science adopts, perhaps provisionally, as its “ultimate” principles,
just because they have no further ground, remain “inexplicable”;
and the farther they are from the familiar, the more they will seem
“miraculous”.
In this sense, miracles are a natural part of the dialectic of science.
This loss of the taste for genuine explanation is made palatable by the
Quinean motif of the “ontology” of theories [Stein, 1989, 57]. This is be-
cause the motif does little to dispel the misconceptions noted in §3.3. Here
it is relevant that the focus on “ontology” has tended to bring with it a view
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wherein theories induce (by a privileged semantics) a “crisply” reified image
of the world. This leads naturally to a comparison problem: is the actual
world—independent of our theorizing, and as represented with this privileged
semantics—(approximately) the same as the theory’s image of it? The realists
and anti-realists then look to the history to support their contrasting claims.
But this is to commit “the unphilosophical fallacy” in the several ways of
the last section. Among the misconceptions that seem to get this comparison
problem off the ground is the assumption that theories always imply precise
characterizations of the world. This is evident, for instance, in the debate of
Putnam [1975] and Laudan [1981] regarding the reference of ‘atom’ and ‘ether’.
Each is assuming that a “proper” analysis of the theories in question will reveal
that ‘atom’ and ‘ether’ each correspond to precisely-characterized aspects of
reality that we now know to, respectively, be and not be present. However, this
assumption is problematic. For one, each aspect in fact does appear present in
substantial ways and, moreover, according to the same metric of “presentness”
(i.e., being weighable). More generally though, our understanding of what is
“implied” by the theories has been subtlized, demonstrating that even “fixed”
theories don’t imply fixed, sharp images of the world.
This points to a broader sense in which the unphilosophical fallacy has been
committed here. What underlies the assumption that theories imply precise
characterizations of the world is the privileging of a robust semantics of theory-
world relations. The central notion for Putnam and Laudan, for instance, is
reference. However, the notion does not play for them the same role it does
in the Tarskian semantics from which it appears borrowed.12 Consider the
term ‘ether’ as it occurred in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century theories
(for the moment, let’s assume these “theories” make distinct existence claims
about the ether). Recall the T-schema: ‘. . . ’ is true iff . . . *, where ‘ ‘. . . ’ ’
is a metalanguage name for a claim in the object language and ‘. . . *’ is the
metalinguistic translation of that claim. Let’s consider, as a claim made by the
nineteenth-century theory, the statement ‘Light travels through an ether’. The
T-sentence for this claim as made in the context of the nineteenth-century theory
is then:
‘Light travels through an ether’ is true iff light travels through an
ether*
We are presuming that this statement was taken as true then, hence the latter
is satisfied. Then, the T-sentence for the claim as made in the context of the
twentieth-century theory is:
‘Light travels through an ether’ is true iff light travels through an
ether**
12See Maddy [2007], especially Part II, for a similar and more careful treatment of truth and
reference in scientific inquiry. Like Maddy, Stein appears to consider Tarski a disquotationalist
[Stein, 1989, 50].
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We are presuming that the claim is false, hence the latter is not satisfied. How-
ever, to say with Putnam and Laudan that the former is true while the latter
is false, what has actually changed is the metalinguistic translation (noted with
‘**’), and therefore the base clauses in the metalanguage’s definition of truth.
This is precisely to note that ‘light travels through an ether’ is not a statement
that is true or false simpliciter. Baked into this change is a fluidity of the notion
of reference at play: the notion of reference one distills changes along with the
change of metalanguage, and for this reason it takes a backseat to translation in
Tarski.13 In this sense reference and truth are trivialized in Tarskian semantics:
they are (sometimes useful) linguistic devices meant to capture obvious and ba-
sic features of linguistic use. The machinery doesn’t tell us anything substantial
about either how we do or ought to determine whether a statement is satisfied
or how we do or ought to perform translations. What it actually seems to do
is draw our focus to the changes in knowledge and understanding that inform
these decisions.
There is essentially only one way for Putnam and Laudan to “untrivialize”
reference and truth, though it comes in different forms. One form fixes the no-
tion of reference and insists that translation and truth must run through it. This,
in turn, means that there is an objective and precise fact about the referential
relations enjoyed by a statement. One can then say that ‘Light travels through
an ether’ was considered true by nineteenth-century theorists but was, in fact,
objectively false; since the statement’s referential relations do not change, there
is no meaningful change of the metalanguage. A second form insists that there
is an objective fact regarding the preservation of meaning by translation. What
this boils down to is assuming there is one meta-metalanguage in which all equiv-
alences across metalanguages can be judged: i.e., the meta-metalanguage allows
us to form statements like [Light travels through an ether*]+ iff [Light travels
through an ether**]+ that express the equivalence of metalinguistic translations
of an object-language statement. This essentially allows us to express in the
meta-metalanguage that the nineteenth-century theorist’s metalanguage is not
one that appropriately translates their object-language statement, so that they
misunderstood the genuine meaning of their statement and thereby considered
it true when it was, in fact, false.
These moves are essentially the same, however, in that each treats the se-
mantics as beyond reproach, i.e. outside the dialectic. In the former form,
the nineteenth-century theorist either held the wrong metalanguage or held the
right one and misunderstood it; in the latter form, they either held the wrong
meta-metalanguage or held the right one and misunderstood it.14 But in either
case, it is assumed that we’ve reached the ultimate, not-subject-to-revision lan-
13For instance, the new metalanguage need not even translate the statement compositionally
or in the same compositional manner, the former of which simply eliminates any meaningful
role for reference.
14The errors could, of course, have been in still-higher languages, but I ignore these cases
because the main point is unchanged.
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guage in which we can evaluate “objectively.”15 Though it manifests differently,
the effect is of a kind with the faulty-empiricist double standard: an end is put
to inquiry. Insofar as this is considered a philosophy, it is also to commit the
unphilosophical fallacy in the same way as Huygens: assuming one’s own is the
True philosophy, not subject to modification and thus treated as outside of the
dialectic of science. The problem is thus not reference per se but assuming that
there is a once-and-for-all way to capture word-world relations.16 Because such
assumptions lie “outside” the dialectic, this is to go “external” in the Carnapian
sense.17
3.3. Excessive simplicity
The third motif is an attempt to take the debate as an honest empirical
inquiry into the historical use of theories, despite this not being the aim of Boyd
or Laudan. However, the outcome is still negative. Even taken in dialectical
stride, reference as a robust concept is clearly too simplistic to represent theory-
world relations. What these relations actually look like is better captured by
what Stein calls ‘theoretical structure’. However, one should take care not to
read too much into ‘theoretical structure’; what is meant is loose, something
along the lines of ‘conceptual system’. This is intimated in his nodding to
Hilbert et al. (see Stein [1988]). For them, the goal was Tieferlegung der
Fundamente, which I prefer to translate as ‘foundational deepening ’ to more
strongly emphasize its ongoing nature. Even at their most pristine, which is
to say as a system of axioms, theories were constantly subject to modification,
axioms being added, subtracted, modified, or even removed to elevate “mere”
theorems. This was done according as our understanding of the world and the
conceptual system itself changed. Hilbert, for one, considered this foundational
fluidity in his axiomatic approach “a tremendous advantage”, for it makes room
for conceptual and interpretational play while still allowing one to preserve what
is considered essential mathematical/conceptual components in the process (for
15There is a certain methodological irony here, too: in assuming a True philosophy so
as to provide an objective description of past theorizing, one plays down what can more
fairly be called objective—descriptions of what the past scientists thought they were doing.
Presumably, only the former description is open to revision via scientific developments after
these past scientists’ time.
16The assumption can be especially pernicious, as it has been in discussions of color as a
Lockean quality: what was once taken to be a clear and justly-answerable question about the
nature of things—what quality of bodies does color resemble?—should, by dint of subsequent
research, be seen as fundamentally confused [Stein, 1989, 53-4]. (In fact, research done prior
to Locke’s publication of the Essay showed this Stein [2004].)
17Recall that Stein has a quite liberalized notion of linguistic framework in mind. He is
also acutely aware of the “mutual dependence of frameworks and theories,” and therefore the
danger that “the internal/external distinction may lead to the neglect of important large ques-
tions that span the development of theories” [Stein, 1970, 285-7]. Thus, the internal/external
distinction here is just between dialectical and non-dialectical inquiry. This use of the distinc-
tion appears to be one of the “valuable philosophical lessons” of logical empiricism, alongside
the illuminating discussions of its flaws.
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instance, see Frege’s excerpt of Hilbert’s 29.12.1899 [Frege et al., 1980, 41]).18
Indeed, in pointing to quantum mechanics as one of his concrete examples, the
ever-changing and idiosyncratic nature of how theories represent is a prominent
part of Stein’s conclusions [Stein, 1989, 59]:
I do not claim to have a definitive formulation of the meta-physics of
quantum mechanics; but I believe rather strongly that the difficulties
it presents arise from the fact that the mode in which this theory
“represents” phenomena is a radically novel one. In other words, I
think the live problems concern the relation of the Forms—indeed,
if you like, of the Instrument—to phenomena. . .
In addition to its suggesting that quantum mechanics represents phenomena in
a novel way, this remark suggests that theories prior to it had “represented” in
different modes, too. In equating ‘Forms’ with ‘Instrument’—which we know to
be the acceptable economic manner of speaking of theories—it is underscored
that Stein’s notion of structure is intentionally nonspecific, riding on his non-
specific characterization of theories.
Such uses of reference, as in the case of atoms and the ether, moreover reveal
a misconception of theories as stable and homogeneous sets of beliefs such that
we can specify their every representational feature. They are believed stable
in the sense that what is and is not “in” the theory is clear. This is leveraged
for claims like ‘nineteenth-century electromagnetism implied the existence of
an ether’ to appear sensible, when it is, in fact, often difficult to draw the
line between a theory and its interpretation.19 They are moreover assumed
homogeneous in that their hypotheses and demonstrations are treated as on an
epistemological par. This gives rise to statements like ‘mechanism assumed all
aspects of the world are explainable ultimately in terms of particles’. But this
assumes both an agreement on high-level mechanistic conceptions as well as a
strong reductionism which did not exist generally among its practitioners.
Correcting these misconceptions of theories as stable and homogeneous also
corrects assumptions about how theories evolve and what they are for. When it
is claimed, for instance, that ‘ether’ was believed to refer but was later discov-
ered not to, this is taken to reveal a fairly discrete change in theoretical com-
mitments. Subtleties of what was actually shown aside, this appears to assume
that theoretical advancement is straightforwardly represented with something
like a network of propositions: nodes as beliefs, edges as inferential connections,
and when those beliefs that “impinge” on experience are overturned, we strive
18To get a better feel for what I mean by conceptual/interpretational play see Weatherall
[2018], where it seems even profoundly formal approaches to understanding theories (in the
context of equivalence, in particular) inevitably involve extra-formal judgments of theory-
world relations; the formalism doesn’t just “spit out” an interpretation. This should be still
more obvious with theories axiomatized a` la Hilbert or with those not presently susceptible
to even this approach, the latter of which appear to be most common.
19Thus it was that Hertz’s famous remark that “the Maxwell theory is the system of
Maxwell’s equations” was actually a reflection of a deep scientific achievement. See Stein
[1970, 281-2].
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to “mutilate” as little of the network as possible in accommodating the change.
But this assumes a lot. Not least, it assumes that all the important features
of scientific inquiry are appropriately captured by looking at propositional and
fundamentally representational claims about how the world is. However, impor-
tant features arise also from intimations concerning aspects of this knowledge
itself, including not only the pedigree of the individual nodes but of the con-
nections among them. In at least this sense, science is not only an enterprise
of knowledge but also of understanding Stein [2004]. Thus, when Boyd calls
attention to “the connections of theories with the ongoing process of scientific
inquiry” [Stein, 1989, 51], Stein sees this as a call to attend to these extra- or
merely heuristically-representational aspects of theories—what may broadly be
called methodological, as opposed to metaphysical aspects.
Theories are therefore for more than representing, and as a consequence
their merely representational aspects must be considered in that broader con-
text. In particular, it would appear ill-advised to play one off the other in the
way some RID arguments have tended to. Laudan, on one hand, focuses on the
representational aspect of theories, taking their historical alternations to tell
us that theories are “mere” instruments; Boyd, on the other, appears to focus
predominately on their methodological aspect, taking the historical continuity
to tell us that theories are “moreover” true. The RID thereby tends to generate
from the history “conclusions whose contraries may equally be “demonstrated””
[Stein, 1958, 9] because of an inadequate understanding of the principles guiding
the debate. Both the “wanton” and “teleological” interpretations of the history
have some truth to them; however, as a point of historical fact, neither ade-
quately characterizes any substantial swathe of inquiry on its own. Lost in the
back-and-forth are the varied ends to which theories have been put by science’s
agents: Resources for inquiry—Yes, but. . . representational—Yes, also.
3.4. No difference that makes a difference
Finally, where does the argument of “Yes, but. . . ” leave us with regards to
an understanding of scientific inquiry? The emphasis just placed on science’s
agents in understanding theories suggests one direction: taking seriously what
they think about science and what they think they’re doing when they do it. In
so doing, it also suggests still more concerning the “wanton” and “teleological”
views of inquiry. Not only are they and their presumed opposition—as well
as their hidden philosophical and historiographical premises—inadequate as a
matter of historical fact, they are moreover of dubious worth even as guides to
further inquiry. We recognize this, Stein’s work seems to suggest, when our focus
is returned to inquirers themselves. This focus is evident in what is arguably the
central thread of Stein’s philosophy: if and how individual inquirers can claim
to know anything when they can believe nothing certainly.
As I hope to have shown in §2, Stein was already heartily pulling this thread
in his dissertation. There, the thread culminated in the following question
[Stein, 1958, 392]:
Is the degree of dispassionateness in ultimate formulation, which in
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the view here presented philosophy seems to require, compatible with
the degree of passionate conviction required for a scientist like New-
ton, or Maxwell, or Einstein, to devote himself to the development
of his “daring hypotheses” in the teeth even of great opposition?
As we’ve come to expect, he answers this question by appealing to an example he
considers representative. Funny enough, the example will be familiar to readers
of “Yes, but. . . ”—for it is precisely the one he gives to clarify and make plausible
his “no difference that makes a difference” claim: Maxwell’s systematic removal
of his ether model from the theory of electromagnetism. Unlike in “Yes, but. . . ”,
however, he there makes explicit what answer this example is to give. What
this answer is should, by now, come as no surprise: “Here the history of science
is rather encouraging to the old view of man as capable of rationality” [Stein,
1958, 392-3].
I wish to recommend we take seriously Stein’s belief that it is possible to rec-
oncile these two aspects of genuine skepticism as a call for inquiry into how this
is so; I suspect this is what he intended, too.20 In taking this inquiry seriously,
I think it is appropriate to see this as a development of the RID into a related
question that is both relevant to scientific inquiry (and thereby, philosophy of
science) and more ripe for attack than it was 30 years ago.21. This is no small
undertaking; it is likely to span not only the specific sciences themselves, but
much of the cognitive and psychological sciences, such as perception and atten-
tion, concept formation and structure, learning and expertise, motivation, biases
and constructivity, the structure and functions of memory, developmental, so-
cial, and educational psychology, and aspects of psychology still unconceived or
unrecognized.22 Naturally involved will be a careful attention to how various
aspects of cognition, including mathematics, are embodied, have evolved, and
are culturally shaped. To put things in Stein’s own words, the broader question
is this [Stein, 1989, 55-6]:
. . . how [is it] that our own natural endowment—which has evolved
for its “instrumental” value in coping with far more immediate as-
pects of the world—has also proved to be an “instrument” capable,
20For one, Nancy Nersessian’s doctoral dissertation was titled Scientific Evolutions: On
Changing Conceptual Structures in Science, and her research since has taken a robustly in-
terdisciplinary approach to this cluster of issues. She completed her dissertation with Stein
[Nersessian, 1977].
21I am borrowing from Stein the phrase and conception of question-changing in the growth
of understanding and knowledge [Stein, 2004, 165].
22These issues are highly complex and interrelated, too, necessitating extreme care when
considering “big pictures” of the role our endowment plays in how inquiry works. To give one
example demonstrating (the possibility of!) a kind of upward percolation of conceptual revision
in cognitive research: recent results [Winter et al., 2016] from the centroid paradigm [Sun
et al., 2016] suggest the potential incompleteness of the feature integration theory [Treisman
and Gelade, 1980], the latter of which influences our understanding of the binding problem
as well as Getalt principles. Changes in our understanding of the latter could rather quickly
force modifications to any “big picture” of the nature of knowledge (as evidenced in, e.g.,
[Spelke et al., 1998]).
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under favorable circumstances, of (e.g.) discovering quantum me-
chanics[?]
4. Conclusion
In closing, I would like to return to that fated remark—that what Stein really
believes “is that between a cogent and enlightened “realism” and a sophisticated
“instrumentalism” there is no significant difference—no difference that makes
a difference” [Stein, 1989, 61]. On its face, as Stanford intimates, the claim
appears to be about two views per se: upon finessing, the views themselves
converge such that they are no longer distinct. Understood this way, it would
seem that the RID is still “well-joined” in the sense that its broadest ambitions
are clear and well-founded but that (i) the realist and instrumentalist views so
far proffered in the RID are wrong, and (ii) the correct view is something of a
blend of the two.
This isn’t quite right. As the scare quotes seem to indicate, we aren’t dealing
with views at all, let alone views proffered in the context of the RID. On the one
hand, a sophisticated “instrumentalism” recognizes that theories are for repre-
senting in addition to being resources or “instruments” for inquiry; it has been
“sophisticated” in that it has traded in the anti-realist’s philosophical skepticism
for the genuine skeptic’s reserve. Having done so, the error of the faulty em-
piricist double-standard is apparent, and thus returns the capacity for genuine
discrimination by fidelity to detail. On the other hand, a cogent and enlightened
“realism” recognizes that theories are resources or “instruments” for inquiry in
addition to being for representing; it is “cogent” and “enlightened” in that it
has traded in the transcendental philosopher’s pseudo-answers—explanations
disconnected from their explanandum—for the genuine skeptic’s discrimination
by fidelity to detail. Having done so, the error of the faulty realist’s claim to
the True philosophy is apparent, and thus returns a genuine reserve. With the
hubris of the RID realist and the despair of the RID instrumentalist removed,
there is no clear debate left: the genuine skeptic makes quick dialectical work of
the oversimplifications born in the realist and instrumentalist of the “unphilo-
sophical fallacy”, and with these goes, too, the judiciousness of realism versus
instrumentalism.
What is therefore left are two manners of speaking : a “realism” whereby one
speaks passionately of what the world is and isn’t like, so far as we know, and
an “instrumentalism” whereby one speaks dispassionately of the forms of our
current theories while still taking them seriously as about the world. To speak in
either manner is to strive to live in accordance with the twin virtues of genuine
skepticism—to practice balance and judgment. That these different manners
of speaking—passionately with Maxwell as a “realist” or dispassionately with
Lorentz as an “instrumentalist”—make no difference in the practice of our best
scientists, as the history suggests, is then an empirical fact about us in our
relation to the world. So for at least as long as it remains cogent to say that
these manners of speaking differ while making no difference, we should seek to
understand how this is so.
27
P. Kyle Stanford. Instrumentalism. In The Philosophy of Science, pages 400–
400. Psychology Press, 2005.
Howard Stein. On the present state of the philosophy of quantum mathematics.
In PSA 1982, pages 563–581, 1982. vol. 2.
Howard Stein. After the baltimore lectures: Some philosophical remarks on the
subsequent development of physics. In Robert Kargon and Peter Achinstein,
editors, Kelvin’s Baltimore Lectures and Modern Theoretical Physics, pages
375–398. MIT Press, 1987.
Howard Stein. An Examination of Some Aspects of Natural Science. PhD thesis,
University of Chicago, 1958. University of California: Microfilm.
Howard Stein. Was carnap entirely wrong, after all? Synthese, pages 275–295,
1992.
Howard Stein. On the notion of field in newton, maxwell, and beyond. In
Roger B. Stuewer, editor, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Sci-
ence, pages 264–287. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, vol. V;
University of Minnesota Press, 1970.
Howard Stein. The enterprise of understanding and the enterprise of knowledge–
for isaac levi’s seventieth birthday. Synthese, 140:135–176, 2004.
Howard Stein. Maurice clavelin on galileo’s natural philosophy. British Journal
for the Philosophy of Science, 25:375–397, 1974.
Howard Stein. On locke, ‘the great huygenius, and the incomparable mr. new-
ton’. In Phillop Bricker and R.I.G. Hughes, editors, Philosophical Perspectives
on Newtonian Science, pages 17–47. MIT Press, 1990a.
Howard Stein. Newton: Philosophy of inquiry and metaphysics of nature. Un-
published manuscript, a.
George Smith. Closing the loop: Testing newtonian gravity, then and now. In
Newton and Empiricism, pages 31–70. Oxford University Press, 2014.
Howard Stein. Yes, but...: Some skeptical reflections on realism and anti-realism.
Dialectica, 43:47–65, 1989.
Howard Stein. Physics and philosophy meet: the strange case of poincare´.
Unpublished manuscript, b.
Howard Stein. ‘from the phenomena of motions to the forces of nature’: Hy-
pothesis or deduction? In PSA 1990, pages 209–222, 1990b. vol. 2.
Howard Stein. On philosophy and natural philosophy in the seventeenth century.
Midwest Studies in Philosophy, 18:177–201, 1993.
28
Richard Boyd. On the current status of the issue of scientific realism. Erkenntnis,
19(1-3):45–90, 1983.
Richard Boyd. What realism implies and what it does not. Dialectica, 43(1-2):
5–29, 1989.
Hilary Putnam. Philosophical Papers: Mathematics, Matter and Method, vol-
ume 1. Cambridge University Press, 1975.
Larry Laudan. A confutation of convergent realism. Philosophy of Science, 48
(1):19–49, 1981.
Penelope Maddy. Second Philosophy: A Naturalistic Method. Oxford University
Press, 2007.
Howard Stein. Logos, logic, and logistike´: Some philosophical remarks on the
nineteenth century transformation of mathematics. In History and philosophy
of modern mathematics, volume 11, pages 238–259. Minnesota studies in the
philosophy of science: Minnesota University Press, 1988.
Gottlob Frege, Gottfried Gabriel, Brian McGuinness, and Hans Kaal. Philo-
sophical and mathematical correspondence. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980.
J. O. Weatherall. Theoretical Equivalence in Physics. ArXiv e-prints, October
2018.
Nancy Nersessian. Scientific evolutions: On changing conceptual structures
in science. Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms. Howard Stein and
Raymond J. Nelson, supervisors., 1977.
A.N. Winter, C. Wright, C. Chubb, and G. Sperling. Conjunctive targets are
hard in visual search but easy in centroid judgments. Journal of Vision, 16
(12):750–750, 2016.
P. Sun, C. Chubb, C.E. Wright, and G. Sperling. The centroid paradigm: Quan-
tifying feature-based attention. Attention, Perception, and Psychophysics, 78
(2):474–515, 2016.
A. Treisman and G. Gelade. A feature-integration theory of attention. Cognitive
Psychology, 12(1):97–136, 1980.
ES Spelke, E Newport, and R Lerner. Nativism, empiricism, and the develop-
ment of knowledge. Handbook of child psychology, 5th ed., Vol. 1: Theoretical
models of human development, pages 275–340, 1998.
29
